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SMART BABY MONITORS: THE MODERN
NANNY OR A HOME INVADER
Sarah Ensenat +

Washington state parents Sarah and Jay used a smart baby monitor to ensure
the safety of their child.1 The couple became concerned when their three-yearold son told them he was talking to a man in his room at night.2 One night Sarah
and Jay waited in their son’s room and heard a voice over the smart baby monitor
say, “Wake up little boy. Daddy’s looking for you.”3 The couple also observed
the camera of the smart baby monitor following them when they were in the
room with their son.4 Stories like Sarah and Jay’s are unfortunately common.5
Recently in the news, smart baby monitors reportedly have been hacked in Indiana, Texas, and Minnesota.6
Smart baby monitors exist to help parents protect and watch over their children.7 Parents buy smart baby monitors so they can watch and listen to see if
+
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Martin for her assistance and support in the research and writing of this comment. The Author would also like to thank the hard work and dedication of the associates and editors of
the Journal of Law and Technology for their hard work on the preparation of this comment.
1
Brendan Kelly, Parents Warn Others After Baby Monitor Gets Hacked, AMERICANOW (June 5, 2017), http://www.americanow.com/story/society/2017/03/16/parentswarn-others-after-baby-monitor-gets-hacked.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.; see also Rochester Family Finds Their “Nanny Cam” Hacked For The World to
See, KTTC (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.kttc.com/story/28712087/2015/04/03/rochesterfamily-finds-their-nanny-cam-hacked-for-the-world-to-see (recounting a nation-wide increase in the hacking of smart baby monitors).
6
Kelly, supra note 1; see also Rochester Family Finds Their “Nanny Cam” Hacked
For The World to See, supra note 5.
7
See Jenna Flannigan, Parental Warning: Your Baby Monitor Can Be Hacked, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/healthline-/parental-warning-yourbab_b_11668882.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2017); see also Winston Ross, How to Protect
Yourself From the World’s Perviest Hackers, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 15, 2013, 3:11 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/15/how-to-protect-yourself-from-the-worlds-perviest-hackers.html (describing how parents can protect their smart baby monitors from
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their infant or child is in need of help.8 Low-tech hackers are able to compromise
smart baby monitors and use the footage of infants and children for nefarious
purposes.9 Hackers upload the videos of children to illegal websites or keep the
videos for their personal use.10 Additionally, burglars can use the footage from
smart baby monitors to break into homes.11
Older baby monitors, or analogue baby monitors, worked over radio waves
and were easily hacked.12 People would listen to private conversations or say
threatening and lewd things to children.13 As technology advanced, companies
manufactured smart baby monitors that worked over the Internet and connected
to a home’s personal router.14 Unfortunately, most homeowners’ personal routers
are not secured, leaving some smart baby monitors accessible to anyone who
can find the camera’s Internet address.15 Security of smart baby monitors has
always been an issue that has not been properly addressed by federal and state
legislatures.16 Regulations such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) are in place to force technology companies targeting children to prioritize the privacy of the children’s personal information.17 These regulations do
not adequately address security for personal smart products such as smart baby

hackers).
8
Flannigan, supra note 7; see also Ross, supra note 7 (describing how parents can protect their smart baby monitors from hackers).
9
Flannigan, supra note 7; see also Ross, supra note 7 (describing how parents can protect their smart baby monitors from hackers).
10 See Flannigan, supra note 7 (discussing the ease in which smart baby monitors can be
hacked and identifying who are the likely hackers of the monitors).
11 See generally Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers May Clean Your Clothes, But Hacks
Can Clean Out Your Privacy, And Underdeveloped Regulations Could Leave You Hanging
on A Line, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 259, 274-93 (2016) (discussing that
smart devices, including smart baby monitors, can be easily hacked without proper regulations).
12 Ross, supra note 7.
13 Id.
14 Anthony Cuthbertson, How To Protect Baby Monitors From Hackers, NEWSWEEK:
TECH & SCI. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/how-protect-baby-monitors-hackers-421104.
15 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketer of Internet-Connected Home Security
Video Cameras Settles FTC Charges It Failed to Protect Consumers’ Privacy (Sept. 4,
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-connected-home-security-video-cameras-settles [hereinafter Press Release, Federal Trade
Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013] (explaining the need to secure personal routers to limit public access
to wireless devices like smart baby monitors).
16 Eli Dourado & Andrea Castillo, Poor Federal Cybersecurity Reveals Weakness of
Technocratic Approach, 2–3, 5, (MERCATUS CTR. AT GEO. MASON UNIV., June 2015),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Dourado-Poor-Federal-Cybersecurity-MOP.pdf.
17 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §6502 (2015) (stating the purpose of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act).
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monitors.18 COPPA focuses on advertising companies and websites collecting
personal information on children and not personal-sized smart objects.19
This Comment advocates for stricter federal security legislation for smart
baby monitors that requires: 1) stricter login credentials for the smart baby monitor’s network, 2) a department to monitor the security of a product and the potential breaches of privacy, 3) training and continuing education for individuals
monitoring the security of products, and 4) the notification of consumers if their
privacy has been breached and the provision of free services to remedy the
breach.20 Section I of this Comment introduced the lack of security surrounding
smart baby monitors. Section II of this Comment provides a background in the
rise of Internet hacking and discusses the history of legislation for personal smart
technology products like smart baby monitors. Section II also illustrates a failed
attempt to create stricter security legislation and new legislation in New Jersey.
Section III of this Comment addresses existing regulations the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has put in place to promote better security measures for
smart baby monitors. This Section then discusses where smart baby monitor security stands today, and addresses the attempt to enforce regulations through a
previous FTC suit against a smart baby monitor manufacturer. Section IV of this
Comment explores a current case filed by the FTC against a smart baby monitor
technology company. This case could change the way smart baby monitor manufacturers and Congress address legislation regulating the security of smart devices. Section V of this Comment continues to evaluate how the FTC has applied
existing federal legislation and regulations to smart baby monitor manufacturers.
Section VI of this Comment proposes and analyzes suggestions for federal legislation to protect consumers from smart baby monitors. Finally, Section VII of
this Comment concludes with a recommendation to Congress to revise COPPA
or create new smart baby monitor focused legislation. New legislation focused
on improving the security of smart baby monitors must be promulgated to ensure
the protection of consumer privacy. Without new legislation, Congress and the
FTC cannot ensure that all smart baby monitor manufacturers are applying the
best security measures to their smart devices and providing the best support for
consumers when hackers invade their privacy.

18 See generally Davenport, supra note 11 at 261 (explaining that “there is more work
needed to minimize these risks that come along with the convenience of using IoT devices.”).
19 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2015).
20 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 55,717 (Sept. 11, 2013) (analyzing the proposed consent order between the FTC and TRENDnet).
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THE RISE OF INTERNET HACKING AND THE HISTORY OF IOT LEGISLATION
Hacking low-security technology can be easily learned.21 Widely available
books and classes have made it easier for one to take a course or check out a
book at a local library.22 Anyone with vocational training or self-taught training
in computer programming can learn to hack Internet devices.23 Personal smart
technology items such as phones, smart-watches, and baby monitors are difficult
to protect with strong security measures.24 The danger of personal smart devices
is the insecurity of the Internet of Things (IoT), which connects smart devices.25
The IoT comprises “everyday devices that are connected to the Internet” that can
be “remotely controlled or sensed.”26 The IoT is connected to everything used in
daily life and viewed as connected to products essential to every man, woman,
and child.27 These everyday devices include smart baby monitors.28
A. History of IoT Security Measures

21 See generally wikiHow to Become a Hacker, WIKIHOW, https://www.wikihow.com/Become-a-Hacker (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (describing the low barriers to obtaining the ability to hack low-security technology).
22 See Brandon Stosh, 5 Free Websites to Learn Hacking!, FREEDOM HACKER (Dec. 23,
2015), https://freedomhacker.net/top-free-websites-to-learn-hacking-2016-4842/; see generally Computer Programming, DC LIBRARY CATALOG, https://catalog.dclibrary.org (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (conducting a search of the DC Library catalog provides access to several books that are available to teach individuals Internet coding and hacking).
23 See generally wikiHow to Become a Hacker, supra note 21.
24 Amelia R. Montgomery, Just What the Doctor Ordered: Protecting Privacy Without
Impeding Development of Digital Pills, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 147, 169 (2016) (illustrating the vulnerability of personal smart electronic devices).
25 Laura Jehl, Jonathan Meyer & Sonja Carlson, Attack of The Zombie Webcams: DDoS
Attacks And The Insecure IoT, LAW 360 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/861699/attack-of-the-zombie-webcams-ddos-attacks-and-the-insecure-iot; see Rachel
Metz, Finding Insecurity in the Internet of Things, 119 MIT TECH. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2016, at
76 (acknowledging that “by 2020, almost 21 billion gadgets will be connected to the Internet” and in effect, such connectivity increases the “potential ways for cyberattackers to
wreak havoc.”).
26 Jehl et al., supra note 25 (recognizing that many consumers do not realize IoT devices sold by manufacturers come with default usernames and passwords capable of being
reset and warning consumers to be aware of similar devices that do not permit such change).
27 See generally Cate Lawrence, IoT Security Concerns Show an Industry Struggling to
Keep Up, READWRITE (Feb. 5, 2016), https://readwrite.com/2016/02/05/iot-security/ (stating
the numerous smart products that are used by both adults and children are vulnerable); see
also Jehl et al., supra note 25 (illustrating that connected devices includes both obvious connected devices and non-obvious devices including “toasters and lightbulbs”).
28 Jehl et al., supra note 25.
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The IoT does not have a strong history of security legislation or regulation.29
Hackers have the ability and incentive to take over these smart devices, including smart baby monitors.30 Whether their purpose is to create a digital army31 or
steal the personal information including video footage of consumers, hackers
can hijack a baby monitor without the parents even knowing.32 The IoT device
security is “ripe for government regulation,” but manufacturers do not have
strong incentives to secure their devices until customers demand it.33 As long as
consumers continue to buy their products, manufacturers do not feel a need to
increase security.34
B. History of Federal Legislation
There are currently some existing federal security laws and regulations to enforce cybersecurity, but they do not address smart baby monitors.35 They address
Internet use and company storage of children’s personal and private information.36 The laws and regulations especially focus on advertisers targeting children and their collection of the children’s private information.37
In 1998 Congress passed COPPA to protect the personal information of children and minors.38 The purpose of COPPA is to regulate “unfair and deceptive
acts and practices in connection with collection and use of personal information
from and about children on the internet.”39 As technology evolved, the Federal
Trade Commission attempted to strengthen COPPA by passing an amendment

29 Id.; Randy Milch, A First Legislative Step in the IoT Security Battle, LAWFARE (Aug.
4, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/first-legislative-step-iot-security-battle.
30 Jehl et al., supra note 25.
31 A “digital army” consists of two or more hackers that take control of millions of IoT
devices to launch an attack on major service providers. Unsecured devices such as smart
baby monitors can be used to infect other devices in the vicinity and easily hijack connected
devices. See id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13
(2013) (describing regulations implementing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act);
see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012).
36 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13; see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06.
37 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06; see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13.
38 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06; see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13.
39 See 15 U.S.C. §6502.
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to COPPA on July 1, 2013.40 Children’s personal information was further protected by clarifying the definitions of “operator,”41 “website or online service
directed to children,”42 and “support for internal operations.”43 The new COPPA
requirements also changed requirements for obtaining informed consent of parents,44 strengthened safe harbor programs,45 and created strong provisions to keep
kids information confidential and secure.46 Requirements were not set for manufacturers of smart baby monitors and other smart products that work over the
Internet; requirements were only set for web operators and the third parties to
which they sell the children’s personal information.47
C. Failed Federal Amendment
The federal government has tried to pass legislation to improve the regulation
of baby monitors.48 In March of 2012, the House rejected Crowley Amendment
40 Amended COPPA Rule Comes into Effect, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO.
SEC. L. BLOG (July 1, 2013), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2013/07/01/amendedcoppa-rule-comes-into-effect/; see also Lesley Fair, FTC’s Revised COPPA Rule: Five
Need-To-Know Changes for Your Business, FTC: BUS. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2012/12/ftcs-revised-coppa-rule-fiveneed-know-changes-your-business (describing the revised COPPA rule).
41 Operator is defined as “an operator of a child-directed site or service where it allows
outside services, like plug-ins or advertising networks, to collect personal information from
visitors.” Fair, supra note 40; see also Amended COPPA Rule Comes into Effect, supra note
40.
42 Website or online service directed to children is defined as “a plug-in or ad network
when it has actual knowledge that it’s collecting personal information through a child-directed website or service...requiring them to provide notice and get parental consent only for
those who identify themselves as under 13.” Fair, supra note 40.
43 Support for internal operations “include[s]...contextual advertising, frequency capping, legal compliance, site analysis, and network communications. Operators may not,
without parental consent, use or disclose information collected to contact a specific person,
including through behavioral advertising, to amass a profile on that person or for any other
purpose.” Id.
44 “Operators must send [notice] directly to parents before collecting personal info from
their kids.” The notice must be “to-the-point” and include “what operators have to put in
their online privacy policies about their information practices.” Id.
45 Safe harbor programs provide incentives for companies to self-regulate and ensure
they are in compliance with COPPA. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012).
46 COPPA created strict provisions, which companies must follow, and they will improve the confidentiality and security of children’s information. Under these provisions,
“[o]perators are required to take reasonable steps to ensure that children’s personal information is disclosed only to service providers and third parties capable of maintaining the
confidentiality, security, and integrity of such information.” Amended COPPA Rule Comes
into Effect, supra note 40.
47 Fair, supra note 40.
48 See S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted) (providing that the Senate recommends the United States develop a strategy for the Internet of Things to promote economic
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No. 1, which would have affected any regulation relating to baby monitors promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).49 The purpose of
the FCC is to control “communication laws, regulations, and technological innovation.”50 The Crowley amendment would have required baby monitors to
display a warning label to inform consumers that the video and sound captured
by baby monitors and smart baby monitors could be easily viewed or heard by
someone outside of the home.51
The FCC is not the only government agency that has attempted to compel
Congress to reform security requirements. After the Amendment failed, the
FTC52 released a report detailing a privacy framework intended to “articulate
best practices for companies that collect and use consumer data.”53 The attempts
have been unsuccessful because of limited public interest and lackluster Congressional oversight.54 Unless constituents alert Congress to the security problems and media outlets draw Congress’ attention, congressional oversight is a
common problem.55
D. Enacted State Legislation
Not only has the majority of the proposed legislation not been passed, the
proposed legislation does not sufficiently restrict bad behavior or promote the
growth and consumer empowerment); 158 CONG. REC. 50, H1624 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012)
(proposed Floor Amend. 1 to H.R. 3309, 112th Cong.); see generally H. Amend. 1 to Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th Cong.
(proposed to House, Mar. 27, 2012) (recommending that “the packaging of an analog baby
monitor to display a warning label” so that families are informed that video and sounds
“may be easily viewed or heard by potential intruders.”).
49 158 CONG. REC. 50, H1624 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (proposed Floor Amend. 1 to
H.R. 3309, 112th Cong).
50 About the FCC, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/about/overview (last visited Dec. 19,
2017) (explaining that the FCC is an independent agency overseen by Congress that “regulates interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable in all 50 states. . .”).
51 Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th
Cong. (2012).
52 About the FTC, FTC.GOV, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Dec. 19, 2017)
(explaining that the FTC is an independent agency overseen by Congress whose purpose is
to prevent “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices…”).
53 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at iii (2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
54 Id.
55 See generally Jared Bomberg, FTC litigation prompts changes to congressional oversight, IAPP (Oct. 27, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/ftc-litigation-prompts-changes-to-congressional-oversight/ (stating that new litigation prompted congress to take a closer look at
regulations and common practices).
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security of IoT devices.56 Much of the legislation proposes a warning label on all
smart baby monitors that warns parents of their potential to be hacked.57 Anything more restrictive has experienced difficulty being passed or has not been
drafted at all.58 While the federal government has been unsuccessful in passing
legislation to secure smart baby monitors, states have begun to fill the gaps.59
New Jersey passed legislation that requires greater security measures for
smart baby monitors.60 Once the Assembly passed the legislation, the Senate reviewed it.61 After amendments by the Senate were included, the Senate passed
the legislation and sent it to the Assembly for a “second reading on concurrence.”62 The Assembly again passed the legislation and Governor Chris Christie
signed the bill.63 The passing of this legislation could provide a great start to
holding manufacturers of smart baby monitors accountable for their security
breaches of consumer privacy.64
The language of the original proposed bill required:
[b]aby monitor[s] that broadcasts audio or video through an internet connection
shall be sold or offered for sale in the States unless it includes: (1) security features
to prevent unauthorized users from hearing or viewing activity; and (2) a label or
notice warning consumers of the risks associated with an unsecured baby monitor
connection, and the importance of accessing the baby monitor securely and using
its security features.65

The smart baby monitors sold in New Jersey must contain a clearly worded

Dourado & Castillo, supra note 16.
See S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Mar. 24, 2015) (“[E]xpressing the
sense of the Senate about a strategy for the Internet of Things to promote economic growth
and consumer empowerment”); see generally Federal Communications Commission Process
Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th Cong. (2012).
58 Korey Clark, States Address Cybersecurity, Election Reform And Other Issues, LEXISNEXIS: STATENET CAPITOL J., https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/state-net/b/capitol-journal/archive/2017/07/07/states-address-cybersecurity-election-reform-and-other-issues.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
59 Id.
60 See generally N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017) (requiring
“internet-connected baby monitors to include security features” and a warning label).
61 N.J. Assemb., Legis. History of N.J. Assemb. B. 3581,
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/default.asp (type 3581 into bill number search engine; follow
A3581 link) (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Lilo H. Stainton, Getting The Word Out on NJ’s Big ‘Baby Box’ Giveaway, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/17/03/16/getting-the-word-outon-nj-s-big-baby-box-giveaway/.
65 See N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017) (describing the security
requirements for baby monitors).
56
57

2018]

Smart Baby Monitors

9

warning66 about potential security risks and technical features designed to thwart
such infiltration.67 The legislation continues to describe the security requirements for the smart baby monitor.68 The bill’s final language, now law, says that
smart baby monitor manufacturers are required to follow five security measures
that state manufactures must:
(1) provide end-to-end encryption; (2) provide Certificate-based Authentication for
manufacturer access when obtaining updates, registering, or relaying audio or video
between Internet servers; (3) prohibit unauthorized access, including prohibiting
implied third-party trusted access; (4) prevent a consumer from disabling security
measures; and (5) include conspicuous and easily understandable instructions supplied by the manufacturer notifying consumers about the proper use of the baby
monitor and its security enhancement.69

New Jersey could inspire other states to adopt legislation securing smart baby
monitors that would hopefully draw Congress’ attention in the near future.70
Congressional enforcement of stricter security legislation is the consumers’ best
hope in ensuring the privacy of their family and children.71
FEDERAL REGULATION
To enforce federal law, federal agencies work to ensure smart baby monitor
manufacturers are able to understand enacted legislation.72 Additionally, agencies promulgate regulations to fill gaps in the law to make it more efficient and
effective.73 If manufacturers do not comply with regulations, then agencies bring
actions to enforce compliance.74
A. History of Federal Regulation
See id.
Stainton, supra note 64.
68 See N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017).
69 See id. (quoting the bill’s five required security measures).
70 Alfred Ng, Congress to smart device makers: Your security sucks, CNET (Aug. 2,
2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/congress-senate-iot-device-makers-your-security-sucks/.
71 Id.
72 About the FTC, supra note 52.
73 Id.; see FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13
(2013).
74 Jose Pagliery, FTC sues maker of routers, baby monitors over security, CNNMONEY
(Jan. 5, 2017, 7:42 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/05/technology/ftc-d-link-lawsuit;
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against
TRENDnet, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc [hereinafter
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept.
4, 2013, supra note 15.
66
67
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In response to Congress passing COPPA, the FTC promulgated regulations to
inform the public how they would apply COPPA.75 The FTC is an agency that
was created in 1914 by Congress to “prevent unfair methods of competition in
commerce.”76 Congress has given “the agency greater authority to police anticompetitive practices over the years.”77 In 1938, Congress directed the FTC to
apply several consumer protection laws “including the Telemarketing Sales
Rule, the Pay-Per-Call Rule, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.”78 Then in
1975, Congress authorized the FTC to regulate trade rules of industry.79
Now, the FTC’s purpose is to prevent “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair
business practices…”80 The FTC protects consumers by filing suits against businesses and corporations not following safety and security requirements.81 In
1975, Congress granted the FTC authority to regulate the technology field.82
COPPA falls primarily under the FTC’s jurisdiction, allowing the agency to create regulations as standard practices for technology companies that are intertwined with children’s products.83 The FTC regulations §§ 312.1-312.12 describe how the FTC applies COPPA to the industry.84 Specifically, the regulations require technology companies that provide services over the internet to
notify parents of any data retention of their children’s personal information, to
obtain parental consent for any retained personal data, and to prevent the storage
and collection of children’s personal information over the Internet.85
COPPA and the FTC regulations only focus on operators’ data collection and
storage.86 Consequently, they do not identify security measures smart baby manufacturers must take to prevent hackers from collecting and storing children’s
personal information.87 The FTC has issued press releases and policy reports encouraging stricter asking Congress to approve legislation and create regulations
for security and privacy of smaller technology products such as smart phones,

See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13 (2013).
About the FTC, supra note 52.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 What We Do, FTC.GOV, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Dec.
19, 2017).
82 About the FTC, supra note 52.
83 Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FTC.GOV,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequentlyasked-questions (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
84 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.12 (2013).
85 See id.
86 See 15 U.S.C § 6502 (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.12.
87 See 15 U.S.C §§ 6501-05; see generally 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13.
75
76
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smart watches, and baby monitors.88 The FTC has been unable to sway Congress
thus far.89 Without legislation for these new smart products, they are vulnerable
to potential hackers.90 As a result of Congress’ lack of response, the FTC attempts to implement their recommendations by charging manufacturers of smart
baby monitors with deceptive and unfair practices.91
B. Gaps in Regulation
In February 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13718 to create
the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity (CENCS) in an attempt
to improve national security and develop new technical solutions.92 The purpose
of the CENCS is to:
make detailed recommendations to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and
private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and
national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions,
and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the
private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices.93

The CENCS’ December 2016 report included six main imperatives and various
recommendations and actions that should be taken to better reinforce cybersecurity.94 While their recommendations and actions are commendable and can be
applied to smart baby monitors, they only provide advice on what should be

88 Pagliery, supra note 74; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Feb. 7, 2014, supra note
74; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15.
89 See Bomberg, supra note 55 (stating that new litigation prompted congress to take a
closer look at regulations and common practices).
90 See id.; Daniel Cooper, Senators push legislation to protect election systems from
hacks, ENGADGET (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/10/31/senate-save-act/
(commenting on the Securing America’s Voting Equipment Act as a legislative initiative to
prevent domestic and foreign interference with election systems via hacking and uphold Department of Homeland Security’s designation of election systems as “crucial infrastructure”).
91 See generally Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 2,
FTC v. D-Link Corp., No. 3:17 Civ. 39 (N.D. Cal. 2017), 2017 WL 65168 (asserting the alleged violations of D-Link Corp. and their alleged deceptive act or practice).
92 Exec. Order No. 13718, 81 Fed. Reg. 29, 7441 (Feb. 9, 2016) (creating the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity).
93 Id.
94 COMM’N ON ENHANCING NAT’L CYBER SEC., REPORT ON SECURING AND GROWING
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 53-59 (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/02/cybersecurity-commissionreport-final-post.pdf.
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done.95 The CENCS does not have the power to enforce any of its recommendations or take the actions it requests.96 Instead, that power lies only with the leader
of the executive branch, or the President.97
Per the December 2016 report issued, any recommendations that are to be
implemented will occur during the Trump administration.98 President Trump was
scheduled to sign an executive order on cybersecurity on January 31, 2017, but
abruptly failed to sign at the last minute.99 In turn, President Trump announced
that “the U.S. will take quick action to secure critical infrastructure and networks
and modernize IT systems.”100
In addition to national security, President Trump wants to focus on improving
the private sector.101 When President Trump held off signing the executive order
on cybersecurity, he stated that the federal government “must work with the private sector . . . to make sure that owners and operators . . . have the support they
need from the federal government to defend against cyber threats.”102 In early
May 2017, President Trump signed a new executive order on cybersecurity.103
President Trump’s executive order provides that federal “agencies should be
held accountable for their own cybersecurity and requires . . . that they introduce
the cybersecurity framework developed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).”104 Only time will tell if the new executive order is effective.
C. FTC Suit to Enforce Regulations
Previously, the FTC filed suit against a smart baby monitor manufacturer for
its failure to adhere to the regulations promulgated by the agency to ensure
proper implementation of COPPA.105 In the settlement of the suit, the FTC issued

Id.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Cyber security executive order signing canceled, CBS NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 3:56
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-cybersecurity-executive-order/.
100 Sean D. Carberry, Trump postpones cyber executive order, FCW (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://fcw.com/articles/2017/01/31/trump-cyber-eo-delay-carberry.aspx.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Morgan Chalfant, Congress offers some early praise of Trump’s executive order, THE
HILL (May 11, 2017, 5:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/333039-congress-offers-some-early-praise-of-trumps-cyber-executive-order.
104 Id.
105 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb 7, 2014, supra note 74; Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15.
95
96
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additional recommendations to remedy these issues industry-wide.106 In 2013,
the FTC brought suit against TRENDnet, Inc., a producer of IP cameras used in
smart baby monitors.107 An IP Camera is a camera used for video surveillance
through a network connection. 108 Most IP Cameras can be adjusted and viewed
from any web browser through Internet access if the IP Camera’s network is
known.109 Before the suit went to court, TRENDnet settled with the FTC and a
Consent Order110 was issued.111
The FTC alleged that TRENDnet had (1) publicly transmitted consumer login
credentials over the Internet; (2) stored consumers’ login credentials on personal
smart devices that was easily readable; (3) failed to monitor and correct vulnerabilities and security breaches; and (4) failed to provide reasonable security in
the design and testing of the software in the IP cameras.112 By failing to abide by
the FTC promulgated regulations, the company subjected their consumers to a
106 See TRENDnet, Inc., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment,
78 Fed. Reg. 55,717, 55,718 (Sept. 11, 2013) (describing the proposed consent order between the Federal Trade Commission and TRENDnet); Press Release Feb. 7, 2014, supra
note 74; see also S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Expressing the sense of the Senate
about a strategy for the Internet of Things to promote economic growth and consumer empowerment”); Comm’n on Enhancing Nat’l Sec., Exec. Order No. 13718, 81 Fed. Reg. 7441
(Feb. 9, 2016). See generally Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 135
(2014) (discussing the security vulnerabilities around every day small electronics such as
Fitbit trackers, insulin pumps, and baby monitors being hacked and the need to ensure that
they are secure when being purchased).
107 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. 176 at 55,717-18.
108 See Encyclopedia, Definition of: IP Camera, PC MAG. (last visited Dec. 19, 2017),
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/60055/IP-camera (directing the reader to see the
definition of “Network Camera.”); Encyclopedia, Definition of: Network Camera, PC MAG.
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/60055/network-camera.
109 See Encyclopedia, Definition of: IP Camera, supra note 108; Encyclopedia, Definition of: Network Camera, supra note 108.
110 A Consent Order is “a voluntary agreement worked out between two or more parties
to a dispute...[and] has the same effect as a court order and can be enforced by the court if
anyone does not comply with the orders.” Consent Order Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/consent-order/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). Administrative agencies, such as the FTC, may issue Consent Orders in which a manufacturer agrees
to “the imposition of certain disciplinary sanction.” Consent Orders allow the parties involved to “resolve a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the agency without the time and expense” of going to court. Id.
111 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,719.
112 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,718.
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significant risk that the live feeds of their smart baby monitors would be compromised, exposing young children to the chance of being observed and recorded
by strangers.113 TRENDnet marketed its cameras as secure but they had faulty
software “that left them open to online viewing, and in some instances listening,
by anyone with the cameras’ Internet address.”114
The consent order required TRENDnet to create a better security program and
apply safeguards to prevent consumers’ privacy from being compromised.115 In
addition, TRENDnet was ordered to retain third-party service providers outside
of its company to maintain the security of its smart baby monitors and alert consumers when they have been affected by a breach in security.116 The specificities
of the consent order fall under nine parts.117 Part I of the consent order prohibits
TRENDnet from misrepresenting the level of its security measures or the level
of protection over which the consumer has control.118
Part II of the consent order establishes eight explicit requirements to create an
effective security program.119 The eight requirements necessitate the creation of
a new position to organize and run a security program that identifies risks to
security and consumer privacy.120 They also require a more secure design process
and regular testing of the security of their devices.121 The manufacturer must
adopt any new developments in cybersecurity to ensure the best protection of its
consumers’ privacy at all times.122
Part III of the consent order requires TRENDnet to implement a security program that meets the requirements of Part II of the consent order, and that the
security program operates with “sufficient effectiveness.”123 Part III also requires
TRENDnet to biennially obtain a report from a third-party on the effectiveness
of its security.124
113 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,718.
114 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74.
115 Id.; see generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,718.
116 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,718.
117 See TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment,
78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
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Part IV of the consent order requires TRENDnet to notify consumers whose
smart baby monitors security has been breached.125 TRENDnet also must provide
free instructions to consumers on how to remove the flaw and uninstall or update
its IP cameras.126 Parts V through IX focus on reporting and compliance provisions that dictate how long TRENDnet is required to follow the provisions.127
The hope is TRENDnet will maintain the requirements on its own once the requirements have been implemented and followed for 20 years.128
FTC SUIT AGAINST D-LINK
On January 5, 2017, the FTC filed suit against D-Link and its United States
subsidiary in San Francisco’s federal court.129 D-Link is a producer of the Digital
Baby Monitor Day/Night cloud Camera and Wireless Network Camera, both of
which are smart baby monitors.130 The complaint states D-Link failed to take
reasonable steps to secure the routers and Internet protocol cameras that it designed, marketed, and sold, especially in the form of smart baby monitors.131 The
FTC alleges D-Link’s signing key132 was exposed on a public website, and since
the default passwords were hardcoded into their machines, its products were easier to hack.133 Hackers who break into smart baby monitors are able to observe
families and their homes through the cameras, sometimes speak to vulnerable
children, and listen to private conversations in the home.134 Some hackers are
pedophiles who wish to spy on children, and others are criminals who either use
the device to gather personal information or case the home to rob the family.135
Id.
Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Pagliery, supra note 74; Theodore F. Claypoole & Taylor Ey, FTC Files to Protect
Consumers’ Security in the Internet of Things, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 21, 2016),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-files-to-protect-consumers-security-internet-things.
130 Pagliery, supra note 74.
131 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 5, 6, FTC v. DLink Corp., N.D. Cal. (filed Jan. 5, 2017) (No. 3:17 Civ. 39), 2017 WL 65168, at ¶¶ 14, 15.
132 Signing keys are a technique used for code-signing which “use digital signatures to
provide identity and integrity for software applications.” Code Signing Best Practices, MICROSOFT 5 (July 25, 2007), https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/dn653556(v=vs.85).aspx; see also Bruce Morton, Code Signing: Best Practices, ENTRUST DATACARD: IDENTITY ON BLOG (July 27, 2012), http://www.entrust.com/code-signing-best-practices/ (describing how to protect private signing keys with code signing).
133 Pagliery, supra note 74.
134 Cuthbertson, supra note 14; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-connected-homesecurity-video-cameras-settles.
135 See Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (noting how hacking instances of baby monitors are
becoming more common and providing advice on how families can protect themselves);
125
126
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The FTC has repeatedly warned D-Link about these “back door” flaws since
2007 but to no avail.136 D-Link has always stated that it is in compliance with
COPPA and has not misled its consumers in the level of security its baby monitors contain.137 The FTC has not alleged any breach of product sold by D-Link,
only that its routers and IP cameras used in smart baby monitors show a pattern
of poor security practices.138 In the suit against D-Link, the FTC charged D-Link
with six violations of FTC regulations which specifically enforce COPPA.139 The
FTC alleges D-Link “failed to take reasonable steps to secure the software for
their routers and IP cameras” exposing consumers’ local networks and allowing
unauthorized access to sensitive personal information.140 Additionally, the FTC
alleges that D-Link misrepresented the quality of the security it was providing
to customers in all of its products, including its smart baby monitors, and therefore constitutes a deceptive act or practice.141 The FTC requested the court
“[e]nter a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the FTC Act.”142
The FTC also asked the court to award the costs of bringing the action to the
FTC and any additional relief the Court determines to be appropriate.143
On September 19, 2017, the court issued an Order Re Motion to Dismiss,
granting in part and denying in part D-Links’ motion to dismiss.144 Counts I, IV,
and V of the FTC’s complaint were dismissed with leave to amend and the
agency was given until October 20, 2017 to revise their complaint against DLink.145 The judge asserted that the complaint failed to specifically identify an
incident where a consumer was harmed, and only alleged that the lack of security
could lead to a breach in consumer’s personal information.146 Additionally, the
Ross, supra note 7.
136 Pagliery, supra note 74.
137 See Joe Uchill, D-Link fires back on FTC security complaint, THE HILL (Jan. 6,
2017,12:23 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/313028-d-link-fires-back-on-ftcsecurity-complaint (“D-Link Systems maintains a robust range of procedures to address potential security issues, which exist in all Internet of Things (IoT) devices.”).
138 Id.
139 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 131 at
11-13 (stating the alleged violations of D-Link Corporation).
140 Id. at 6,11 (“An attacker could compromise a consumer’s router, thereby obtaining
unauthorized access to consumers’ sensitive personal information.”).
141 Id. at 12 (describing D-Link’s alleged promotional misrepresentations).
142 Id. at 13.
143 Id.
144 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Systems, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00039-JD, 2017, WL
4150873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017) (order granting dismissal of the unfairness claim,
deceptive practices claim, and misrepresentation claims against D-Link but denying the motion to dismiss in all other respects).
145 Id. at *6.
146 Laura Northrup, Judge Gives D-Link Partial Win In FTC Case Over Vulnerable Devices, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:28 PM), https://consumerist.com/2017/09/20/judge-
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judge encouraged the FTC to focus on their deception claims rather than those
which pose potential harm to American consumers.147 On October 17, 2017 the
court granted an extension for the FTC to file an amended complaint until January 12, 2018.148
The case is ongoing and represents the first instance a smart baby monitor
manufacturer has not settled with the FTC.149 The outcome of this case is critical
to the future of personal smart products, including smart baby monitors.150 Now
that this case is in federal court, it should alert Congress to the need to promulgate new legislation to improve security for smart baby monitors.
FTC ATTEMPTS TO RECTIFY SECURITY ISSUES
Security measures have continued to adapt as technology has evolved.151
Smart baby monitor manufacturers have the technological capabilities and the
resources to enhance the security of their products, but because of either negligence or lack of knowledge, do not take advantage of the protections available.152
To remedy the lack of knowledge, better communication and education of proper
security measures needs to be available to manufacturers.153 In hopes of remedying this problem, the FTC issued recommendations and regulations for manufacturers of smart baby monitors.154 To comply with the FTC’s recommendations

dismisses-ftc-case-accusing-d-link-of-selling-vulnerable-devices/.
147 Id.
148 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Systems, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00039-JD (N.D. Cal. Oct.
16, 2017) (order scheduling the deadline to add parties or amend pleadings).
149 See Pagliery, supra note 74 (recognizing that usually these types of suits settle).
150 See generally id. (commenting on the risk that baby monitors pose is how easily they
may be hacked); Jared Bomberg, FTC Litigation prompts changes to congressional oversight, IAPP (Oct. 27, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/ftc-litigation-prompts-changes-to-congressional-oversight/ (describing Congress’ increased attention to FTC suits at the behest of
the corporations that the FTC has filed suit against).
151 Janet Miller, 7 Ways Technology is Changing Home Security, HUFFINGTON POST: THE
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-miller/7-ways-technology-is-changing-home-security_b_8324548.html.
152 Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (describing the protections available to protect parents
from baby monitor hacking); see also Flannigan, supra note 7) (discussing the security risks
around wireless home devices, including baby monitors, and how while the device may
have some security risks it is also crucial that the owner keep up with updates and determine
which manufacturers are most compliant with FTC regulations).
153 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC REPORT ON INTERNET OF THINGS URGES COMPANIES TO
ADOPT BEST PRACTICES TO ADDRESS CONSUMER PRIVACY AND SECURITY RISKS (Jan. 27,
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staffreport-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC IOT REPORT].
154 Id.
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and regulations, the manufacturers need to regularly check and monitor the regulations posted by the FTC.155 They must do so to ensure compliance and demonstrate they are consistently up to date with the new security and privacy measures
available to manufacturers of smart baby monitors.156
The FTC has attempted to remedy the negligence of smart baby monitor manufacturers, but their methods have been ineffective.157 The FTC has had some
success via the judiciary system.158 One smart baby monitor manufacturing company, TRENDnet, settled with the FTC and agreed to implement extensive regulations for its security.159 Another smart baby monitor manufacturer, D-Link,
refused to settle and is fighting the FTC’s allegations in court.160 The Circuit
Court’s decision will either apply the broad requirements of COPPA to the narrow regulations created by the FTC, or they will recommend to Congress that
COPPA needs to be amended to include stricter security measures and procedures for smart baby monitors.161 Even if the Court applies the broad terms of
COPPA and the FTC regulations to force D-Link to apply stricter security
measures and procedures, Congress should still draft legislation to reflect the
application of COPPA provided by the court.
The appropriate remedy to protect the privacy of consumers of smart baby
monitors is stricter security laws and regulations for the manufacturers of these
products.162 The FTC has pleaded with Congress to enact legislation based on its
regulations and recommendations.163 The FTC has stringent regulations that can
be effectively transformed into legislation, such as establishing and maintaining
“reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of
personal information collected from children” and preventing data retention of
Id.
Id.
157 See generally id. (discussing that despite the information and technology available to
smart baby monitor manufacturers, stricter security measures and stronger consumer privacy
protection has not occurred despite FTC encouragement to adopt better practices).
158 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; TRENDnet,
Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,71718. See generally Claypoole & Ey, supra note 129; Pagliery, supra note 74 (describing what
the lawsuit sought to enforce).
159 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15.
160 Pagliery, supra note 74 (describing D-Link products and their lack of security).
161 See James Cooper, What’s In Store for the FTC’s Privacy & Data Sec. Program in
2017?, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2017, 10:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesccooper1/2017/03/08/whats-in-store-of-the-ftcs-privacy-data-security-program-in2017/#7e22daf41874 (predicting Congress’ reaction to the FTC suit against D’Link and its
effect on privacy and data security in 2017).
162 See id.
163 FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 148 (explaining that despite FTC encouragement to
adopt better practices, stronger consumer privacy protection measures that could institute
permitted and prohibited uses have not commenced).
155
156
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personal information collected from children.164 Additionally, the conditions outlined in settlement of the TRENDnet suit are strong requirements that should be
adopted by Congress.165 If Congress adopts the requirements expressed in the
TRENDnet consent order, the security of smart baby monitors will increase dramatically.166 This will provide more safety for consumers of smart baby monitors
when using the products.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO SECURE SMART BABY MONITORS
Some manufacturers of smart baby monitors have adopted their own regulations based on the TRENDnet suit.167 Two smart baby monitor manufacturers
that have embraced self-regulation and increased security measures are Mattel
and Amazon.168 These manufacturers can serve as examples to Congress and
other smart baby monitor manufacturers of the ways they can follow best practices of the protection of consumer privacy.169 For those smart baby manufacturers that do not self-regulate their security measures, federal legislation must be
imposed.
There are a few key points from the TRENDnet suit that can be proposed as
legislation to increase security and the protection of consumers’ privacy. Suggested legislation would require 1) stricter login credentials; 2) a department to
monitor the security of a product and the potential breaches of privacy; 3) training and continuing education for individuals in charge of monitoring the security
of products; and 4) the manufacturer to notify consumers if their privacy has
been breached and provide free services to remedy the breaches. 170 These four
proposed security measures for smart baby monitor manufacturers are further
discussed below.
A. Stricter Login Credentials and Updates to Programs

164 15 U.S.C. §6502(b)(1)(D) (2012); see generally Cooper, supra note 156 (stating that
the Federal Trade Commission regulations have effectively acted like federal statutes and
have removed the harm requirement of the regulations).
165 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
166 See generally id.
167 See Mark Wilson, Mattel is Building an Alexa For Kids, FAST CO.: CO. DESIGN (Jan.
3, 2017), https://www.fastcodesign.com/3066881/mattel-is-building-an-alexa-for-kids (describing their new product Aristotle and their focus on COPPA compliance and protecting
children’s personal information).
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
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First, stricter login credentials for smart baby monitors can be easily achieved
and protected. Consumers usually leave login credentials for their smart baby
monitors at factory settings because consumers are unaware of the risks they
face.171 Factory login credentials are historically easy to hack.172 The average
consumer does not understand the risks to their privacy or even how to change
their login credentials on their smart baby monitors.173 Some smart baby monitors do not even allow the factory set passwords to be changed.174 The login keys
are not protected by the manufacturers and are even publicly transmitted over
the Internet.175 The easiest remedy to mitigate this risk is to require smart baby
monitor manufacturers to have stricter login credentials.176 For those devices that
have fixed login keys, creating login keys that can be changed by the consumers
allows for an extra level of protection aside from the protections that should be
built into the smart baby monitors.177
Second, there needs to be advanced encryption of login keys.178 There are
methods for transmitting login keys safely over the Internet that are available to
manufacturers, but manufacturers do not use these methods.179 The lax security
of login credentials is not due to unavailability of appropriate technology, but to
the negligence of the manufacturing companies.180 The best practices for code

See generally Jehl et al., supra note 25.
See generally id.
173 See generally id.
174 See id.
175 Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (explaining that manufacturers publicly transmit data over
the Internet for parents to view live feeds, many of which are not protected); Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15.
176 Login credentials are encrypted login keys, or a type of coded password, that are created by the manufacturers. Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (exploring the most effective ways to
mitigate the risk of security breaches, including stricter login credentials); Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15.
177 Cuthbertson, supra note 14.
178 See generally Shivali Best, Are Hackers Watching You and Your Children? Yet Another Flaw in Samsung’s Security SmartCam Could Let Criminals Spy on Your Home,
MAILONLINE: SCI. (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article4136412/Are-hackers-watching-home.html (discussing the opportunity hackers have to access a parent’s network, turn the camera on, and potentially lock their account without advanced encryption of login keys); TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to
Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
179 Best, supra note 173 (exemplifying Samsung as a manufacturer that has chosen not to
utilize available methods for safely transmitting login credentials, and instead chose to remove the web interface feature altogether); see generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,718.
180 Best, supra note 178 (exemplifying Samsung has a manufacturer that has chosen not
to utilize available methods for safely transmitting login credentials, and instead chose to remove the web interface feature altogether).
171
172
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signing,181 or encryption of login keys, are (1) to minimize unauthorized access
to private keys; (2) to protect private keys with cryptographic hardware;182 (3) to
time stamp the code for easy verification; (4) to use test-signing;183 (5) to authenticate all and any codes; (6) to scan for viruses before signing keys; and (7) to
change the use of keys and certificates often and revoke signing keys when a
security flaw is discovered.184 Instead of relying on the inexperience of consumers, manufacturers should be required to protect the transmittance of login credentials so the easily hacked network keys are no longer an issue.185 Security
login credentials are not the only problem smart baby monitor manufacturers
need to remedy.
In addition to a lack of secure login credentials, manufacturers leave holes for
hackers to enter products around the updates they send to consumers.186 Often
the php files,187 which provide updates to baby monitor cameras, are not properly
secured.188 The scripts often have bugs that allow non-admin users to gain remote
access to the smart devices.189 The updates consumers receive are to improve the
functions of the application used to control the smart baby monitors.190 Smart
baby monitor manufacturers are constantly updating the applications to prevent
bugs in the programming.191 When manufacturers provide updates to consumers
181 “Code signing is the method of using a . . . digital signature...in order to verify the author’s identity and ensure that the code has not been changed or corrupted since it was
signed by the author.” If the code has been changed or corrupted since the author signed it,
it has been hacked. What is Code Signing?, SSL SHOPPER, https://www.sslshopper.com/what-is-code-signing.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
182 “Cryptographic hardware does not allow export of the private key to software where
it would be attacked.” Best Practices for Code Signing Certificates, ENTRUST (Sept. 12,
2017), http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=70590.
183 Id. (quoting Test-signing certificates “[help] ensure [the] test certificates are trusted
only within the intended environment.”).
184 Id.
185 Melinda L. McLellan & Kathryn Mellinger, FTC Goes After IoT Device Manufacturer for Alleged Security Vulnerabilities in Routers, IP Cameras, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR:
ENF’T (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/enforcement/ftc-goes-after-iotdevice-manufacturer-for-alleged-security-vulnerabilities-in-routers-ip-cameras/.
186 Best, supra note 178.
187 PHP files can be programmed to collect data and send and receive cookies, which are
used to provide updates to smart devices’ software. PHP Manual: What Can PHP Do?,
PHP: HYPERTEXT PROCESSOR, https://secure.php.net/manual/en/intro-whatcando.php (last
visited Aug. 25, 2017).
188 See Best, supra note 178.
189 Id.
190 See Lisa Vaas, How to Secure Your Baby Monitor, SOPHOS LTD. (Apr. 24, 2015),
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/04/24/how-to-secure-your-baby-monitor/ (explaining how to access software updates for smart baby monitors in order to enhance security).
191 See Taylor Martin, How to Prevent your Security Camera from Being Hacked, CNET
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-prevent-your-security-camera-frombeing-hacked/ (acknowledging parents can and should update the monitor firmware frequently, whenever possible).
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to improve the security of their smart devices, the manufacturers need to ensure
that the update is sent safely to consumers.
B. Security Monitoring Department
Manufacturers, especially large manufacturers, have difficulty securing their
smart devices.192 Another simple way for large manufacturers to prevent the invasion of consumer privacy and violation of their security is to require the manufacturers of smart baby monitors to create a department to monitor the security
of their products.193 Third parties will often test the security of smart baby monitor products and their networks to determine their ability to be hacked.194 Third
parties will then notify the manufacturers of the flaws, but manufactures often
do not respond to the notifications.195 The holes in the smart baby monitor products and networks are easily penetrated and never repaired by the manufacturers.196
If the manufacturers establish a department dedicated to probing for holes and
remedying any breaches they discover, the smart baby monitor products and networks could be constantly updated to prevent any new threat.197 These departments will ensure the security of their smart baby monitor products and networks
is repeatedly reinforced and can assure the continued protection of consumer
privacy.198 Many companies have not created a security-monitoring department
due to an apathy towards security and improper budgeting.199 Smart personal
product companies such as Mattel and Microsoft prioritize the security of their
consumers’ personal information.200 By prioritizing security, they have ensured

Best, supra note 178.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,718-19 (Sept. 11, 2013).
194 Best, supra note 178.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74 (advising comprehensive security programs designed to address security risks in order to prevent new emerging
threats); see generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
198 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74 (stressing the importance of these security departments in protecting security, confidentiality, and integrity
of information); see generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid
Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
199 See generally Vaas, supra note 190 (acknowledging that manufacturers still aren’t incorporating adequate security into their products, leaving consumers responsible to add layers of protection themselves).
200 See Mark Hachman, Mattel and Microsoft reveal Aristotle, a tabletop digital nanny
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their security monitoring departments receive the proper training and funding
they need to be effective.201 Other manufacturers of smart baby monitors have
no excuse for not establishing an effective security-monitoring department.202
Even if manufacturers claim they cannot afford to establish a new in-house security monitoring department due to the expense, they already possess the requisite resources to do so.203
If the manufacturer cannot establish an in-house security monitoring department, then it should be required to engage a third party security monitoring company.204 When there is a risk for a breach of customers’ privacy, these third party
security monitoring companies can either enhance the security measures of the
manufacturers’ smart devices or issue a report to manufacturers informing them
of the necessary changes to their smart devices they must take to remedy potential breaches in consumer privacy.205 Third parties often supply manufacturers
with reports warning the manufacturers of potential risks, but they are frequently
ignored.206 By forcing manufacturers to employ their own department or third
party security monitoring company, they will have the advice of the reports provided to them.
There should also be an additional requirement obligating manufacturers of
smart baby monitors to apply the advice and findings of the reports.207 Simply
obtaining the reports does not ensure the manufacturing companies will apply
the findings of the reports.208 These reports, whether obtained in house or through
third-parties, provides valuable insight to any gaps or holes in their smart baby
monitors’ security.209 This allows smart baby monitor manufacturers to remedy
the breaches in security that could occur.
C. Training and Education
Some manufacturers have existing departments for monitoring security that
for kids, PCWORLD (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.pcworld.com/article/3154902/consumer-electronics/mattel-and-microsoft-reveal-aristotle-a-tabletop-digital-nanny-for-kids.html (describing their new product “Aristotle” and their focus on compliance with COPPA); Wilson,
supra note 167 (describing their new product Aristotle and their focus on COPPA compliance and protecting children’s personal information).
201 See Hachman, supra note 200; Wilson, supra note 167.
202 See Hachman, supra note 200; Wilson, supra note 167.
203 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 55,719.
204 See generally id. (ordering an assessment and report from a third-party professional
that the security provided offers sufficient, effective protection of TRENDnet’s customers).
205 See generally id.
206 Best, supra note 178.
207 See generally id.
208 See generally id.
209 See generally id.
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are not properly trained or updated on changes in the security field.210 As the
ability of Internet hackers to break through security defenses increases daily,
manufacturers must ensure their security-monitoring department is constantly
evolving to best keep out Internet hackers.211 The security monitoring departments are the first and last lines of defense for the protection of consumer privacy.212 By providing training and education for their security monitoring departments, manufacturers can provide the best service available to protect their
customers.213
D. Consumer Notification and Remedies
As discussed above, there have been attempts by some state and federal legislatures to provide adequate notification to consumers but it has not been
enough.214 Some of the proposed legislation has not passed and some has
passed.215 To make consumers aware of the dangers and liability they face in
purchasing smart baby monitors, manufacturers should be required to provide
more than a mere warning label on the box. While a warning label on the smart
baby monitor boxes is helpful, manufacturers should be required to make the
warning labels easily readable. The law should require manufacturers to provide
information in a manual on how consumers can best protect themselves from
harm and a violation of their privacy.216 The manufacturer should include the

See generally id.
See Thomas Fox-Brewster, It’s Depressingly Easy to Spy on Vulnerable Baby Monitors Using Just a Browser, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2015, 9:46 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/09/02/baby-surveillance-with-abrowser/#485918de1aa0 (showcasing how easy it is for hackers to access information and
gain control of baby monitors).
212 See Best, supra note 178.
213 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,718-19.
214 Jehl et al., supra note 25.
215 See S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (2015); see generally Sen. B. 2582, 217th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.J. 2016) (requiring “baby monitors with internet connection to include security features and warning.”); Process Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess.
2012) (articulating that “the packaging of a new baby monitor [is required] to display a
warning label so that families are informed that video and sounds ... may be easily viewed
or heard by potential intruders.”).
216 See Process Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012) (quoting
“the packaging of a new baby monitor [is required] to display a warning label so that families are informed that video and sounds ... may be easily viewed or heard by potential intruders.”); Sen. B. 2582, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016) (requiring “baby monitors with
internet connection to include security features and warning.”); see generally S. Res. 110,
114th Cong. (2015).
210
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manual in the box with any installation and use instructions.217 While manufacturers cannot guarantee consumers will read this information, it is still important
to provide the warnings.218 Other methods such as promotional campaigns on
television or the Internet can spread awareness to consumers of the dangers and
steps they can take to ensure their privacy is protected.219
When the warnings, security monitoring departments, stricter login credentials and software updating procedures fail, manufacturers should have a plan to
remedy the security breach.220 The law should require manufacturers to notify
consumers of the breach in security and the potential invasion of their privacy.221
Then, the law should also require manufactures to fix the bugs and create a patch
for the smart baby monitors to prevent future breaches from occurring.222 Manufacturers should provide support for consumers whose privacy has been compromised to recommend steps consumers could take to rectify the violation and
provide recommendations on how to help prevent future breaches from occurring.223
Smart baby monitor manufacturers should be held accountable for their actions and be required to do more than alert consumers to the security breach, and
the potential exposure of consumers’ private and personal information.224 By
compelling smart baby monitor manufacturers to patch the breach, future security breaches of consumer personal information would decrease significantly.225
Additionally, spending the money and resources to help consumers contain the
damage they have suffered by the exposure of their personal information will
encourage smart baby monitor manufacturers to improve their security.226 The
expense they will incur is all the motivation smart baby monitor manufacturers
need to strengthen security. Some smart baby monitor manufacturers are taking
note of the FTC suits and are motivated to improve their security.227
Sen. B. 2582, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016).
See generally Sen. B. 2582, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016), (requiring “baby
monitors with internet connection to include security features and warning.”).
219 See generally id. (highlighting that recent news articles have raised awareness about
baby monitors, by raising awareness to consumers of the dangers, they can take proactive
steps to ensure privacy).
220 See TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment,
78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719.
221 See id.
222 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,719.
223 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74.
224 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,718-19.
225 See generally id.
226 See generally id.
227 See Jerry Lee, Mattel Nabi Announces First-Ever Connected Kids Room, Powered by
IOT, MICROSOFT: BLOG (Jan. 5, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/iot/2017/01/05/mattel217
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E. Aristotle
One manufacturer of baby monitors recognized the need for stricter security
regulations to protect the privacy of families and children.228 Mattel and Microsoft partnered to create Aristotle, a smart baby monitor branded as a “tabletop
digital nanny.”229 Aristotle is “a voice-activated smart assistant.”230 It answers
questions for the parents and children, orders baby supplies when they get low,
sings babies to sleep, and plays games with the children.231 Aristotle is controlled
through an application on consumers’ cellular phones.232 Aristotle uses a voiceactivated speaker, streams encrypted video to the consumers’ smart phone, and
uses special software designed to increase the security of the smart baby monitor
and protect consumer privacy.233
Executives from Mattel and Microsoft assert that the companies built Aristotle in accordance with COPPA compliance to ensure children’s privacy is maintained.234 Additionally, there are no default passwords. Without default passwords, the smart baby monitor is less exposed to hackers.235 Mattel and Microsoft
designed the technology so that “the phone and Aristotle forget their own encrypted connection via Bluetooth... [and] [a]ll data is always encrypted to and
from devices and to and from the cloud.”236 Mattel and Microsoft were not compelled by the FTC to incorporate these security measures into their new device
they chose to regulate themselves.237 Congress can use the success of Mattel and
Microsoft’s Aristotle to promulgate legislation for other smart baby monitor
manufacturers with which to comply. Other smart baby monitor manufacturers
should look to Mattel and Microsoft’s example if they wish to prevent future
nabi-announces-first-ever-connected-kids-room-powered-by-iot/ (exemplifying Mattel as a
company who has been motivated to take extra security measures to strengthen security of
smart baby monitors).
228 See id.
229 Hachman, supra note 200.
230 Sean Hollister & David Priest, Mattel Aristotle is an Amazon Echo That Understands
Your Kids, Too, CNET (Jan. 5, 2017, 11:09 AM), https://www.cnet.com/products/aristotleby-nabi/preview/.
231 Id.
232 Hachman, supra note 200.
233 Id. (discussing how Aristotle has been built in compliance with COPPA, which ensures privacy by eliminating default passwords, as well as streaming data and using a connection that is encrypted); Hollister & Priest, supra note 230 (discussing Aristotle’s secure
features such as voice-activated smart assistance, and encrypted video).
234 Hachman, supra note 200.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See generally Lee, supra note 227 (“[U]sing Mattel and Microsoft as an example of
companies who have ‘taken security very seriously’ and discussing various security features
they have implemented”).
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litigation and security breaches of their consumers’ privacy.
Despite the enhanced regulations Mattel and Microsoft have applied to Aristotle, the smart baby monitor will not be impervious to hackers, but it will be
significantly safer.238 Mattel and Microsoft should still ensure they have an easily
readable warning label, an effective security-monitoring department, increased
education and training for the security-monitoring department, and established
remedies for the consumers when their privacy is compromised.239
Aristotle is the start to a safer smart baby monitor, but more can always be
done to ensure stronger security. Congress cannot rely on all smart baby monitor
manufacturers like Mattel and Microsoft to adopt effective security measures on
their own. Congress must promulgate laws to force the compliance of other
smart baby monitor manufacturers and to enhance the security measures some
smart baby monitor manufacturers are already taking.
CONCLUSION
The FTC suit against D-Link and the progressive actions of Mattel and Microsoft are only the beginning of increased security measures in smart baby monitors.240 Hopefully, other smart baby monitor manufacturers will realize the importance of protecting the privacy of their consumers and the consumers’ children. Once other manufacturers of smart baby monitors detect the changes occurring in the industry, they will begin their own processes to increase the security of their smart devices.
Congress cannot rely on manufacturers of smart baby monitors to take on this
daunting task of implementing stricter security measures on their own. Congress
must promulgate new legislation specifically to protect the privacy of children
involving smart baby monitors. Whether COPPA is to be modernized, a new
federal law is established, or there is multiple new state laws regulating smart
baby monitors and the manufacturers individually, something needs to change.
Regulating the security of baby-monitors is important to the privacy and
safety of children, and new legislation should be adopted to enforce security.
Few smart baby monitor-manufacturing companies are motivated to improve

238 Hachman, supra note 200 (describing their new smart baby monitor and the safety
measures they took to comply with COPPA to ensure the protection of their consumers’ privacy and personal information).
239 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 55,719.
240 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra
note 74 (describing the various safety and security requirements for TRENDnet’s smart
baby monitor products in their consent order with the FTC); Hachman, supra note 200.

28

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 26.1

security to protect consumers’ privacy and personal information. The FTC suits
and regulations are not strict enough to force compliance of an entire industry.
Hackers are becoming more sophisticated every day, making smart baby monitors vulnerable to those who wish to invade the privacy of families and young
children.

